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According to the opening sentence of Tibor Scitovsky's 1954 paper, "the concept of 
external  economies  is  one  of  the  most  elusive  in  economic  literature".  Had  Scitovsky 
written his paper forty years later, I am convinced that his opening sentence could have 
been left unchanged. Indeed, the concept of an "externality", which was coined in the years 
following Scitovsky' paper as a more general and more convenient way of referring to the 
phenomenon I propose to examine here, is still one of the most vaguely defined concepts of 
economic theory and one which seems to be a source of considerable embarrassment for 
economists. As late as 1970, after a large number of papers had been published on external 
economies and externalities and virtually all the definitions which are available today had 
been provided on one form or another, Kenneth Arrow could still claim that "nowhere in 
the literature does there appear to be a clear general definition [...] of "externality". 
 While  criticism  directed  against  various  aspects  of  economics  is  common,  it  is 
unusual that it be aimed at an inability to define its basic concepts. However, the concept of 
an externality seems to be an exception. Three symptoms unambiguously reveal the very 
peculiar nature of this concept from this point of view. The first symptom is the following: 
the two authors who have been by far the most widely quoted in the discussion of this 
concept, Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase, have never used the term "externality" or even 
the older expression "external dis/economies" except, in the case of Coase, in discussing 
those  who refer  to  it,  and  in  the  case  of  Pigou,  in  referring  to  a  phenomenon  that  is 
somewhat different from the one which was to influence economists' views on externalities. 
The second symptom is the fact that the importance accorded to this phenomenon by 
the  community  of  economists  has  widely  fluctuated.  For  a  long  time,  the  discussion 
concerned  an important phenomenon (the so-called "pecuniary externalities") turned out to 
have been mistakenly identified as a case of genuine externalities. The word then referred 
to an economic curiosity involving only an apparently very marginal phenomenon. Still 
later,  in the fifties and sixties,  it  became the central theoretical reference of the rapidly 
growing economics of pollution referring, in this context, to a widespread phenomenon. By 
this  time,  it  had  also  become  associated  with  the  concept  of  “publicness”,  whose 
manifestations were pervasive. However, during the sixties and seventies, while the number 
of papers devoted to externalities increased dramatically, many of those who analyzed this 
phenomenon started to doubt whether it referred to anything very specific, and sometimes 
argued as if it was possible and preferable to dispense with it altogether. 
The  third  symptom  is  simply  the  extreme  variety  of  incompatible  meanings 
attributed to the notion of “externality” by a number of eminent economists of various 
intellectual orientation. Indeed, all of the following expressions (or their equivalents) were 
widely used to  characterize  externalities:  "lack of  appropriate  property  rights",  "market 
failure to reach Paretian efficiency", "interdependencies among consumption or production 
functions",  "side  (or  third  party,  or  spillover)  effects",  "impossibility  of  exclusion", 
"presence of (wholly or partially) unpriced inputs or of uncompensated services", "situation 
leaving  room  for  a  free  rider  (or  free  loader)  effect"  and  "situation  associated  with 
excessive transaction costs".  Some of these expressions are rather restrictive and others 
extremely inclusive, but it is clear that they are far from equivalent. Finally, to complicate 
the matter further, externalities have sometimes been associated in unspecified ways with 
such phenomena as publicness, jointness of supply and non-convexities, as well as with the 
so-called "pecuniary externalities".
When it  comes  to  explain  the  peculiarities  of  the  concept  of  an  externality,  my 
hypothesis is that it has always been a "residual" concept for economists. By this I mean 
that it is a concept which, rather than characterizing a specific phenomenon, is a counter-
concept whose function is to designate what is left aside by a more basic concept. In the 
case of  the concept  of  an externality,  this  more basic concept  turns out  to be the very 
concept on which economics is based: the concept of a market. Given that the concept of a 
market itself is,  in some sense, too general and too basic to be defined in a very strict 
manner, it is hardly surprising that its counter-concept, the concept of an externality, has 
also remained a kind of floating concept. However, I do not wish to claim that the concept 
of externality was explicitly characterized and understood as a residual concept in the early 
stages of its development nor that it has continued to be perceived this way during recent 
decades.  Consequently,  a  historical  survey  of  the  various  ways  this  concept  has  been 
understood  and  defined  seems  necessary  in  the  present  discussion.  More  precisely,  by 
following the historical vagaries of the evolution of this concept, my objective is to show 
that,  far  from  being  the  well-defined  technicality  that  it  is  usually  thought  to  be,  an 
externality  is  nothing  but  a  residual  entity  whose  nature  and  very  existence  is  strictly 
dependent on the way economists perceive the market of which it is a residual.
Consequently, this paper will not survey and discus every important contribution to 
economics which has been made with the help of the concept of an externality, but only 
those  contributions  which  have  been  decisive  in  determining  the  very  meaning  of  this 
concept. Through this discussion, I will try to show how and why the scope of this concept 
alternately expands and contracts according to whether the prevailing concept of the market 
was designed in such a way as to require, or not to require, the complementary concept of 
an externality. Finally, I will show that even with the wide acceptance of the neoliberal 
concept of an all embracing market leaving no room for externalities, the concept of an 
externality has survived with an alternative meaning, though not without introducing some 
confusion into economic analysis. I will conclude with a few methodological considerations 
related to the historical vagaries of this concept.        
1 The origin of the concept and the banishment of the pecuniary externalities
When it  was  first  coined,  apparently  by  Paul  Samuelson in  the  fifties,  the  noun 
"externality"  filled  the  long-standing  need  in  economic  terminology  for  a  word  which 
would specifically designate the "external" character of economies and diseconomies which 
had  been  involved  in  a  decades  old  ongoing  debate.  As  for  the  expression  "external 
economies",  it  had  been  used,  long  before,  by  Alfred  Marshall  when,  in  his  famous 
discussion  of  increasing  and  decreasing  returns,  he  distinguished  "external  economies" 
realized by a whole industry from "internal  economies" realized by an individual  firm. 
However, the issue was made more complex by Marshall's disciple, Pigou, who analyzed a 
more general phenomenon which he described in his Economics of Welfare as "divergences 
between marginal social  net  product and marginal private net  product." Actually,  Pigou 
referred to cases akin to Marshallian external economies, but he considered them just one 
type of divergence, and apparently not the most important type. According to Pigou's more 
general  characterization,  divergences  occur  when  "in  some  occupations,  a  part  of  the 
product of a unit of resources consists of something, which, instead of coming in the first 
instance to the person who invests the unit, comes instead, in the first instance (i.e. prior to 
sale if sales takes place), as a positive or negative item, to other people." 
For Pigou, such divergences can be divided into three principal groups identifying 
these "other people" as respectively: "(1) the owners of durable instruments of production, 
of which the investor is a tenant; (2) persons who are not producers of the commodity in 
which the investor is investing; (3) persons who are producers of this commodity.". As for 
the first group, it is well known that the improvements (or deteriorations) of rented goods 
for which a tenant is responsible can be reaped (or supported) by the owner of those goods. 
However, this phenomenon is of a more juridical than economic nature and, since it is not 
really typical of what was to be called "externalities", it will not be discussed further here. 
It is the second group, the more general one (the "other people" involved not being limited 
to those in a specific situation) that was to become representative of what is known as an 
externality in modern analysis. According to Pigou, divergences of this group emerge when 
"one person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to a 
second person B, incidentally also renders services or  disservices to other persons (not 
producers  of  like  services),  of  such  a  sort  that  payment  cannot  be  exacted  from  the 
benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties".  Of such a 
phenomenon,  Pigou  gave  a  great  number  of  examples  which  constitute  a  somewhat 
heterogeneous  but  impressive  list  when  one  considers  that  it  was  published  in  1920. 
Included in this list are uncompensated services or disservices associated with lighthouses, 
parks, public transport, afforestation, lamps at front door of houses, smoke from factory 
chimneys,  scientific research,  spoiling of  houses'  environment  by neighboring factories, 
wearing out of the surface of roads by motor cars, commerce of intoxicants, "veblenesque 
effects" on people's level of satisfaction, purely competitive advertisement, deception in 
goods presentation, etc.   Yet,  it  was the third group of divergences — involving "other 
people" producing the same commodity (in the same industry) — that explicitly referred to 
the Marshallian notion of decreasing and increasing returns. Pigou devotes his chapter XI to 
this phenomenon that is illustrated by various modifications in the market costs incurred by 
an individual firm when the scale of the whole industry is increased. It was this third type 
of divergences that was to be at the center of one of the most memorable debates of the first 
half of this century: the debate about the "empty" boxes of increasing and decreasing costs.  
This debate was to stretch from the twenties to the forties. Insofar as the question of 
the nature of externalities is concerned, its principal result  was the distinction — made 
progressively  through  contributions  of  Knight,  Viner  and  Ellis  &  Fellner  —  between 
pecuniary and technological externalities. This distinction was crucial because it resulted in 
an exclusion of the so-called "pecuniary externalities" — which corresponded roughly to 
Marshallian external economies and to the third type of Pigovian divergences — from the 
realm of  phenomena to  be  considered  under  the  heading  of  "externalities".  Further,  as 
economists came to regard the Pigovian divergences as a source of trouble for economic 
theory, this distinction amounted to the elimination of this source of trouble, at least insofar 
as "pecuniary externalities" —  which, by this time, were the only ones that looked worthy 
of the attention of economists — were concerned.  Indeed, if the debate about increasing 
and  decreasing  costs,  involving  internal  and  external  economies  and  diseconomies, 
mobilized  so  many  great  economists  and  ignited  so  many  passions,  it  was  because 
divergences between marginal social net product and marginal private net product implied, 
according to Pigou, that (without governmental intervention) public welfare could not be 
maximized by market forces, which were directed only by private marginal costs. In this 
context,  one  understands  how  the  conclusion  that  the  most  significant  of  the  alleged 
divergences  correspond  to  pure  illusions  reducible  to  a  pecuniary  phenomenon  was 
received as a happy ending by most economists.  In this debate, the crucial idea centered 
around the meaning of an economic rent.  It is true that the expansion of an industry — 
which is out of the control of a firm and, in this sense, "external" to it — can increase the 
cost of some factors already employed by the firm and constitute a "diseconomy" for it. 
However, as explained by Ellis and Fellner, "if the expansion of an industry gives a factor a 
higher per unit remuneration... the units already being supplied earn producer's rents ... and 
rent is not a cost in social resources."  In such a situation, no extra cost is incurred by 
society as a whole and there is consequently no reason to diagnose a divergence between 
marginal social net product and marginal private net product or to recommend government 
intervention.  Thus,  it  is  the  market  itself  which  takes  care  of  the  so-called  "pecuniary 
externalities".
In any case, in this paper, I am not especially interested in the role of government. I 
am interested, rather, in the nature of externalities. It is important to see how this debate on 
increasing and decreasing costs changed the very nature of externalities or, at least,  the 
connotation of the term "external".  More precisely, when, as a result of the debate, the 
sphere of significant divergences had been cleared of pecuniary externalities, which were 
associated with the type of divergence which Pigou said concerned only "persons engaged 
in the occupation" (or if one prefers, inside a given industry), economists were left with the 
second and more general type of divergence associated with the rendering of incidental 
services or disservices to persons who are in no way engaged in the industry in which those 
services or  disservices are  produced.  As long as  the emphasis  was put  (as  it  was with 
pecuniary  externalities  pertaining  to  the  Pigovian  third  group)  on  economies  or 
diseconomies that were simply external to the firm, externalities could not be said to be 
"external"  to  the  market.  Indeed,  while  external  to  the  firm,  those  economies  or 
diseconomies  were  internal  to  the  industry  and,  since  they  resulted  from  a  set  of 
transactions  in  which  the  firm  itself  was  involved,  it  would  have  not  made  sense  to 
characterize them as external to the market as such. But when we consider situations (those 
pertaining to the Pigovian second group of divergences) concerning people who do not take 
part  to  the  transactions  going  on  in  the  industry,  we  face  a  quite  different  type  of 
divergence. 
Let us remember,  however,  that  Pigou never used the term "external" to refer to 
divergences while Marshall's use of it  did not refer to divergences of this  type (Pigou's 
second group). Given this, why characterize the economies or diseconomies associated with 
these divergences as "external"? At first glance, it seems to be because they are external to 
the  "other  persons"  (or  firms)  referred  to  by  Pigou  as  those  affected  by  services  or 
disservices resulting from an activity under the control of a "Person A". There is no doubt 
here that this influence of an economic agent over the welfare of another is the crucial 
point.  However,  stigmatizing  such  interactions  between  economic  agents  would  sound 
rather odd to economists used to manipulating general equilibrium models, were Pigou not 
to have added "that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation 
enforced on behalf of the injured parties". In such situations, benefited or injured parties are 
in no way involved in market or non-market moves which affect their welfare. They are 
simply not players in any market game related to the benefits they enjoy or to the damages 
they incurred. Typically — think of the case of pollution —, these benefits or damages do 
not come through the market at all. Thus, it would be simply meaningless to pretend that 
the external economies or diseconomies they experienced are internal to industry or to the 
market as a whole; rather, they are external to the market as such.  It was for reasons of this 
kind  that,  in  contrast  to  pecuniary  externalities,  these  genuine  externalities  have  been 
named "technological externalities". It is true that this type of externalities was thought to 
be rather rare by most economists of the time, but since they conflicted with the normal 
functioning of the market, they constituted a challenging theoretical problem for economic 
theory or,  at  least,  a  somewhat troublesome phenomenon. By the end of the debate on 
increasing  and decreasing  costs,  it  became more  and more  common to  regard  genuine 
externalities in this way.
2  The meaning of being “outside the market”
But why would payments not  be exacted and compensations not  enforced? Why 
could some services and disservices be transmitted through the market where others could 
not?  What does it mean for services and disservices to be rendered outside of the market? 
The problem here is that the nature of a market (as a theoretical concept) has never been 
unequivocally defined by economists, probably because the market is, in a sense, the very 
horizon of economic analysis. In such a context, it is hardly surprizing that the concept of 
an externality, which, as we have seen, represents in some sense what this vague structure 
leaves out, was itself left undefined. In any case, if one adopts a minimal view according to 
which a market is a place where goods can be exchanged, and considers that goods have to 
be appropriable and exchangeable (which is roughly the view advocated by Walras), one 
would conclude that anything which is scarce and useful but which cannot be exchanged 
because it cannot be appropriated must be left out of the market and would consequently be 
considered a source of externalities. Thus, the most natural way to characterize genuine 
externalities was through the absence of ownership, "the divorce of scarcity from effective 
ownership" to use Ellis & Fellner's consecrated formulation. Indeed, in his own definition 
of "divergences", Pigou very nearly suggests that most externalities on actual markets could 
be eliminated in principle by the establishment of property rights which would cause the 
resources  involved  "to  come to  the  right  person."  For  his  part,  Knight  based  his  own 
argument against Pigou on the proviso of private ownership.  Clearly, one cannot count on 
the market to take care of that which cannot be appropriated.                                                   
Now, it was rapidly understood that the crux of the phenomenon was not the fact that 
some scarce commodities remain unappropriated and possibly unappropriable. Rather, the 
point is that activities exerted upon these unappropriated commodities affect the welfare of 
other parties, a phenomenon which was systematically analyzed for the first time by J.E. 
Meade in a famous 1952 paper which is often considered the starting point of the modern 
theory of externalities. Using the example of the interdependence between an apple-grower 
and  a  bee-keeper,  Meade  managed  to  formalize  a  concept  based  interaction  between 
activities of agents interfering with one another's production function (which also could 
have been a welfare or a utility function). However, as was underscored by Scitovsky and 
Bator  — and  possibly  anticipated  by  Pigou  —,  to  be  counted  as  an  externality,  such 
interdependence had to be "direct", in the sense that "it does not operate through the market 
mechanism" and in the sense of being "external to the price system, hence unaccounted for 
by market valuations."  After all, everything in economics is a matter of interdependence. 
My utility depends upon the activity of my baker, but as Adam Smith pointed out in a 
famous passage, it is not by benevolence but by self-interest (and therefore through the 
market)  that  he  is  contributing  to  it.  Thus,  while  such  a  situation  is  a  clear  case  of 
interdependence, it would be absurd to describe it as a case of an externality because my 
baker's  service  is  adequately  paid   through  the  market.  If,  by  contrast,  a  case  of 
interdependence is described as external  and as different from what falls under the general 
rule, it is because "it does not operate through the market mechanism". In any case, in the 
tradition  that  dominated  the  fifties  and  remained  quite  important  during  the  sixties, 
externalities were thought to be found anywhere the market mechanism failed to internalize 
— one could almost say to civilize — an interaction going on between economic agents.
In other words, when factors of production are "unpaid" (like Meade's bees which 
are unpaid by the apple-grower) or, more generally, when services remain "uncompensated" 
or  "unpriced"  or  "free",  then  we must  conclude  that  something is  kept  external  to  the 
market and that,  therefore,  externalities are present.  In a formalized representation of a 
market, every agent has a utility function (and every firm has a production function) and 
such functions have various commodities (or factors) as independent variables. But, if some 
commodities (or factors) are unpaid while being independent variables of a function of the 
type               x1 = F (l1, c1, . . . ;  x2, l2, . . .) , these unpaid commodities (or factors) must 
be distinguished from those which are paid; therefore, they have to be put at the end of the 
function,  "to  the  right  of  the  semicolon."   Thus,  in  the  algebraic  representation  of 
externalities typical for this period, the semicolon became the crucial element since its role, 
in a utility or in a production function, was to separate the standard priced elements (those 
on  the  left  of  the  semicolon)  from  the  unpriced  elements  (those  on  the  right  of  the 
semicolon),  which  are  responsible  for  the  externality.  According  to  E.J.  Mishan,  for 
example, "the external effects in production may be exhibited by a production function of 
the form              x = x(a1,…am ; ãn,…,ãw) where x is output, a1,…am, the priced inputs, 
and ãn,…,ãw,  the  unpriced inputs».  In  this  manner,  it  was  made graphically  clear  that 
externalities are nothing but a name for residual activities which are left outside the market, 
"to the right of the semicolon". 
Now, to understand what it means for an activity to be performed outside a market, 
we need to know what it means for an activity to be exerted  inside  it.  For neoclassical 
economists,  from Walras to Samuelson, a market was characterized by reference to the 
paradigms of a perfect competition and general equilibrium. On the one hand, a perfectly 
competitive  market  requires  that  many  conditions  be  fulfilled,  especially  regarding  the 
character  of  the  goods  to  be  exchanged  through  it  (multiplicity  of  identical,  easily 
appropriable  and  exchangeable  units  which  are  usually  also  assumed  to  be  perfectly 
divisible and reproducible). With the market modeled in such a restrictive way, it is not 
surprising that many activities were considered to be going on outside of it. On the other 
hand, in a market represented by elegant general equilibrium models, prices of all those 
goods are strictly determined, given a few fundamental data characterizing the situation. In 
the context of such general equilibrium models,  each good has to be adequately  priced 
according to the rule of the market. Consequently, "unpaid", "uncompensated", "unpriced" 
or "free" goods or services appear clearly to be exchanged outside  the market. In other 
words, if, when referring to a highly demanding modelization of the price system such as 
those implying perfect competition and general equilibrium, one defines "externalities" as 
activities external to such a price system, these externalities — which used to be considered 
rather scarce and looked for only in the bucolic realm of apple-growers and bee-keepers — 
become necessarily pervasive. These theoretical developments were sufficient to explain 
how the concept of an externality became associated with a pervasive phenomenon, but to 
understand its rising practical importance, one has to turn to the sensibility to the problem 
of  pollution  which  was  quickly  growing  during  the  fifties  and  the  sixties.  During  this 
period, the concept of externality was put at the very center of economic debates about 
government  intervention  since  it  was  seen  as  the  natural  candidate  in  explaining  why 
ecological problems remained unsolved by the market. 
In a sense, this idea has been generalized to its extreme limit by Francis Bator who 
associated externalities with the cause of any form of "market failure" to reach a Pareto-
efficient  solution.  For  Bator,   "the  modern  formulation  of  the  doctrine  of  external 
economies, in terms of direct interaction" is full of merits, but it "begs the fundamental 
question" concerning the cause of such externalities.  The standard answer to this question 
in  terms  of  nonappropriability  looks  quite  unsatisfactory  to  Bator,  because  if 
nonappropriability means a simple "inability of a producer of a good or service physically 
to exclude users", it would be a very poor explanation since "“exclusion” is almost never 
impossible."   Fences,  scrambling  devices  and  other  gadgets  can  usually  exclude 
successfully,  but  such exclusions fail  lamentably when the final  goal  is  to  produce the 
Pareto-efficient solution that the market is supposed to. When one resorts to this type of 
solution, "there is no price which will efficiently mediate both supply and demand". Since 
the  problems  associated  with  externalities  are  not  really  solved  by  exclusion  and 
appropriation, Bator decides to broaden the meaning of "externality" and to let this word 
"denote  any  situation  where  some  Paretian  costs  and  benefits  remain  external  to 
decentralized  cost-revenue  calculations  in  terms  of  prices."   Licensed  by  this  broad 
definition,  Bator  and his  followers  did  not  hesitate  to  include  as  externalities  not  only 
"ownership  externalities"  (illustrated  by  Meade's   unpaid  apple-blossom,  by  "shared 
deposits" of fish, by water and even by "the training of nonslave labor to skills"), but also 
"technical  externalities"  (illustrated  by  cases  of  nonconvexities  produced  either  by 
indivisibility  or  by  "smooth  increasing  returns  to  scale"  and  even  by  any  structural 
problems causing monopoly behaviour or misallocation of useful resources), and "public 
good  externalities"  (associated  with  most  kinds  of  publicness,  joint  consumption,  non-
revelation  of  preferences,  etc.).  Bator's  theory  illustrates  particularly  well  how,  once 
neoclassical economists of the time had identified the market with a perfectly competitive 
structure subject to general  equilibrium, the externalities,  as the residual left  by such a 
market, became literally pervasive. 
Even  without  such  a  comprehensive  definition  of  an  externality,  one  could  be 
tempted  to  diagnose  externalities  everywhere  the  market  system  fails  to  arrive  at  an 
efficient solution that the adequate pricing of goods and services normally provides. Thus, 
Mishan proposed the following definition of externalities: "external effects may be said to 
arise when relevant effects on production or welfare go wholly or partially unpriced". For 
example, rather than being excluded  from the consumption of bridge services, individuals 
would be charged  for using them. But, what would be an "adequate" price for a service 
like that  of a bridge which is  provided in a situation of increasing return or even in a 
situation  of  practically  zero  marginal  cost?  Clearly  such  a  service  will  be  "partially 
unpriced". Thus according to Mishan's definition, externalities are also present each time a 
service,  like  the  service  provided  by  a  bridge,  is  "positively  priced"  but  not  priced 
"adequately". For Mishan, as for Bator, externalities (namely the activities which, in some 
sense, go on outside the market) are doomed to be pervasive. 
I have focused on Bator's and Mishan's approaches because they illustrate the extent 
to which the idea that externalities are everywhere in the economic system had taken hold 
by the  fifties  and sixties.  Such views were  very  influential  during these  decades,  even 
during the seventies;  for  example,  Heller  & Starrett  in  1976 defended a  thesis  not  too 
different from Bator's, when they concluded that an externality "can always be associated 
with the failure of some potential market to operate properly." In any case, such views 
illustrate how the concept of an externality tended to be perceived as what I have called a 
residual concept whose definition was directly dependent on the definition of the market. 
Once you have precisely characterized the meaning of that which is called a market, you 
have also determined what is left outside of such a structure, or more exactly, you have 
characterized the activities which the market does not control and each element of these 
residual activities will correspond to an externality. 
But  such  a  view  supposes  that  something  can  be  left  outside  a  market,  which 
sounded sensible for most neoclassical economists of this period because a market was seen 
by  them  as  an  highly  artificial  structure.  From  Walras  to  Samuelson,  neoclassical 
economists had been busily constructing models of ideal  markets.  Actual  markets,  they 
expected had to  be  made to  conform to  such models.  When the  real  world  refused to 
conform  to  these  models,  a  neoclassical  economist  of  the  fifties  or  sixties  typically 
concluded  that  he  or  she  had  to  first  determine  what  the  situation  would  be  like  if  a 
perfectly competitive market prevailed, and then look for a manageable way of attaining the 
closest  approximation of  it.  Because  perfect  competition was  an omnipresent  norm for 
neoclassical economists, it was normal to diagnose externalities everywhere a gap existed 
between actual markets and this ideal model.
3  The neoliberal approach: “externalities” or transaction costs
Our question now is "how has this picture been transformed?" Since I claim that an 
externality is a residual entity, my answer is, unsurprisingly, that it is transformed when the 
representation  of  a  market  is  itself  transformed.  And  indeed,  the  representation  of  the 
market has been radically transformed with the development of neoliberalism during the 
last  decades.  If  the  idea  of  perfect  competition  was  the  paradigm  of  the  market  for 
neoclassical  economists  from  Walras  to  Samuelson,  the  idea  of  “laissez  faire”  is  the 
equivalent paradigm for neoliberal economists, whose influence was already decisive at the 
University of Chicago in the fifties. According to the neoliberals, a real market has very 
little to do with the highly artificial structure designed by the neoclassicals. They have little 
use for the model of the perfectly competitive market , made up of a large number of agents 
of equal standing and of an indefinite number of standardized goods, all capable of being 
fully appropriated and easily exchanged without entailing significant transaction costs.  For 
them, the real world does not  need to be reshaped in the manner of a Walrasian market. For 
them, actual markets, if not systematically impeded, are already capable of providing, not 
without certain costs of course, a relatively optimal solution to allocational problems. By 
contrast, the neoclassical market tended to be conceived as a highly artificial and idealized 
structure whose conditions of realization were so restrictive that in the actual world a large 
number of activities (designated as externalities) were going on outside its reach. These 
externalities were seen as an index of the gap existing between actual markets and this 
artificial  structure.  Not being obsessed by the model of a perfectly competitive market, 
neoliberals could hardly find any meaning in the notion of a "gap" between actual markets 
and an ideal market. Consequently, they could hardly acknowledge any real usefulness in 
the  concept  of  an  "externality".  Since,  in  other  words,  activities  could  no  longer  be 
meaningfully  characterized  as  going  on  outside  the  market,  it  was  the  notion  of  an 
externality  itself  which  tended  to  vanish  alongside  the  development  of  the  neoliberal 
conception of the market. 
But, let us consider further this "neoliberal" image of the market. It is understood as 
any place where gains from trade are possible and consequently where negotiations are 
going on. The agents in such a market need not be of equal standing, like Walrasian agents, 
but are agents who can hold very different amounts of power and  normally make use of the 
power they have. Moreover, the goods which are transacted do not need to be standardized 
goods,  and  if  these  "goods"  are  owned  by  the  above  agents,  it  is  not  necessarily  in 
conjunction with well defined property rights. From an economic point of view, the crucial 
point is knowing who possesses the right to use the things which are considered as goods, 
and not the legal basis of the rights involved. For example, an industrialist operating on the 
shore of a river, may quite economically dispose of his garbage in the river as long as the 
law does not prohibit him from doing so. From a pragmatic point of view, and as far as 
economic relations are concerned, his right to use the river in this way is not fundamentally 
different  from the right he has to use a commodity he has bought on the market. Similarly, 
if the law prohibits water pollution for the benefit of those who enjoy swimming in the 
river, the bathers' right to clean water is not significantly different from more conventional 
property rights. For economists, and especially for neoliberal economists, this means that in 
principle such "rights" can be bought or sold freely on the market.  It  is  true that  such 
atypical commodities are not perfectly exchangeable in the way Walrasian goods are, but 
various types of transactions and negotiations among those who possess these rights are 
possible, and, from this point of view, they are similar to the transactions and negotiations 
that go on between Walrasian traders.
Given  that  the  very  presence  of  any  type  of  trade  (or  negotiation)  resulting  in 
potential gains is enough to characterize a neoliberal market, it is easy to see how there is 
very little room left for externalities. Actual markets — or, to be more explicit, actual forms 
of negotiations occurring where gain from trade is possible — fit the paradigmatic model of 
a  market  by hypothesis.  However,  this  does  not  mean that  neoliberals  consider  all  the 
problems which prompted neoclassicals to identify externalities to be nonexistent. Nor does 
it  mean that  they  consider  all  those  activities,  which,  according  to  neoclassicals,  were 
carried on outside a market (like the use of a river as a garbage disposal system by an 
industrialist), as being instead smoothly carried out inside one. Rather, the point was that 
such  activities  were  seen  as  a  consequence  of  a  particular  market  situation,  namely  a 
situation with prohibitive transaction costs. The main contribution of neoliberal economics 
to our understanding of the market is probably the consideration and analysis of transaction 
costs.  Indeed,  transactions  as  such  are  far  from  being  without  costs.  Searching  for 
information, bargaining and decision making, policing, enforcement and monitoring have 
prices, just as production and transportation have prices. Consequently, it  is not always 
worthwhile  to  "buy"  the  largest  possible  amount  of  such  things.  The  consideration  of 
transaction costs does not directly dissolve the concept of an externality, but it suggests that 
one  should  characterize  the  market  in  such  a  fashion  that  the  phenomena  previously 
described as externalities appear to be nothing but a consequence of a specific calculation 
made on the market. If, for the neoclassicals, the scope of the market is limited by the 
presence of  externalities,  then for  the neoliberals,  it  is  the very efficiency of  its  actual 
working which is limited by the existence of significant transaction costs. 
As is well known, the crucial step in the analysis of such costs was taken by Ronald 
Coase in his seminal 1960 paper on social costs. Coase's strategy was to underline in a 
dramatic fashion the role of social costs in a market by carefully analyzing what would 
happen in their hypothetical absence. And it is this careful analysis which resulted in the 
famous "Coase's theorem". The demonstration of this theorem is straightforward. Given the 
hypothesis of zero transaction costs and rational economic agents, it makes no difference, 
when it comes to the optimal allocation of resources, whether the rights favour the polluter 
or those who suffer from the pollution. The same result will prevail in both situations, since 
both parties will  be ultimately led to a unique optimal agreement.  For example,  in the 
situation described above, suppose that the benefit from the easy disposal of garbage is 
greater than the benefit the bathers derive from clean water,  but  that,  beyond a certain 
amount of pollution, the benefit lost by the bathers becomes larger than the extra benefit the 
polluter gains by polluting more extensively. If the law is against him, then the polluter will 
negotiate with the bathers and buy some "optimal" amount of pollution rights from them. 
By hypothesis, they will accept compensation up to the point where they would start to 
suffer more from pollution than they could benefit from the compensation the polluter is 
ready to offer them. If the law is against the bathers who suffer from the water pollution, 
then it would be in their own interest to bribe the polluter into reducing the amount of 
pollution which he creates to the same "optimal" level as in the previous case and it would 
be in the interest of the polluter to accept such a bribe and reduce pollution to this optimal 
level. Naturally, such a conclusion is purely theoretical since, according to Coase himself, 
transaction costs are highly significant in such situations. Collecting payments from those 
who suffer from the pollution and preventing some of them from cheating by not revealing 
their true preferences would involve, if feasible at all,  tremendous costs indeed. However, 
Coase's intention was not to suggest that the paralyzing effect of such costs could be easily 
overcome and a smooth market organized, but, on the contrary, to suggest that these costs 
must be accounted for in the normal calculations made on a market. 
It is mainly the consequences of Coase's analysis on government policies oriented 
towards  optimality  and efficiency that  have  been extensively  analyzed in  the  literature 
(produced during the sixties and seventies) which discussed externalities in light of Coase's 
theorem. For most of the authors of these papers, the main question was concerned with 
finding the appropriate solution to the problem diagnosed in this  regard.  For them, the 
essential question was to reevaluate, in this new context, Pigou's scheme of intervention 
based on taxes and subsidies.  Rather  than discussing this  reevaluation,  I  would like to 
concentrate on the consequences of Coase's theorem on the very nature of externalities 
themselves. Referring no longer, in this context, to activities going on outside the market, 
the concept of externality indeed looked emptied of its very meaning. 
4  A return to pecuniary externalities or the vanishing of a concept
In  some  neoliberal  analyses,  this  last  conclusion  seems  to  be  verified,  in  an 
unexpected way,  by the vanishing of  the distinction from which,  as  we have seen,  the 
modern  concept  of  an  externality  painfully  emerged,  namely  the  distinction  between 
genuine technological  externalities  and the so-called pecuniary externalities.  In a  paper 
written  in  1964,  Harold  Demsetz,  who  was  a  particularly  active  defender  of  Coase's 
theorem,  did  not  hesitate  to  discount  any  difference  between  these  two  types  of 
externalities.  Like Coase, he consistently avoided the term “externality”, yet the phrase 
“side effects” is specifically chosen by him to replace “external effects” and he compares 
these side effects to what he calls “primary” effects, which are nothing but typical market 
interrelations  or  what,  in  another  context,  would  have  been called  “pecuniary  effects”. 
Demsetz claims that "there exist no qualitative differences" between these two types of 
effects,  the  only  differences  being  "those  that  are  implicitly  based  on  quantitative 
differences in exchange and police cost" or, if one prefers, in transaction costs. To illustrate 
his point, Demsetz uses the following example. "Suppose a factory invents a new more 
efficient furnace which can burn a cheaper grade of coal than can existing furnaces. The 
burning of cheap coal, we will assume, dirties homes in the neighborhood." No doubt this 
“side effect” corresponds to a typical technological externality, but for Demsetz the only 
important point is that it reduces "the wealth of nearby homeowners". However, Demsetz 
continues, "if this same factory, by virtue of its new furnace, successfully forces a nearby 
competing firm out of business, and if the resulting decline in demand for housing reduces 
the wealth of neighborhood homeowners, we do not become concerned". Indeed, this last 
situation  corresponds  to  a  usual  market  or  pecuniary  effect.  Thus  Demsetz  raises  the 
question: "Why the difference in our attitudes toward these two situations which have the 
same effect on homeowners?"  In the case of demand for housing, Demsetz explains, we 
feel that "a smoothly operating market" will maximize wealth. If, in contrast, we cannot 
rely on an existing market in the smoke case, it is because "the cost of exchanging and 
policing smoke contracts" (the transaction costs) are too high "relative to the benefits of 
marketing smoke". However, while this circumstance excludes the presence of an actual 
market, it is fully compatible with the presence of a "potential market" which, according to 
Demsetz,  "stands  ready".  But,  how could  any  activity  be  outside  the  reach  of  such  a 
potential market? If all the transaction costs are to be accounted by the market, either the 
smoke level and the values of the houses are actually controlled by the market according to 
the costs implied or the smoke level is left unreduced and the values of the houses decline 
accordingly because it is made clear by a potential market that controlling the smoke level 
this way would be prohibitive, given the costs involved including transactions costs. In the 
first case, there would be, by hypothesis, no externality, and in the second case, if one takes 
into account the potential role of the potential market, there would be none either. 
It was this last conclusion that was to be made explicit and pushed to its extreme 
limit in a paper published in 1979 by Carl Dahlman. Once transaction costs have been 
placed  on  the  same footing  as  the  usual  production  and  transportation  costs,  it  seems 
normal to raise the same question which is raised concerning these familiar costs. Why 
incur these costs  if  they are themselves larger  than the benefits  to be derived from an 
eventual transaction? After all, you might dream of owning a Ferrari, but if you consider 
that the (production) costs involved are higher than the benefits expected from owning such 
a car, you could decide not to realize this dream without concluding that this absence of 
transaction corresponds to a non Pareto-optimal situation. Dahlman's central idea was to 
apply  such  a  consideration  to  transaction  costs.  According  to  him,  when  assessing  an 
optimal situation, it is a mistake to employ a Walrasian model without transaction costs. 
After all, an ideal world without transaction costs is just as unattainable as an ideal world 
without production costs. This conclusion seems to make sense, but an odd consequence of 
it  is  that,  once  all  transactions  costs  have  been  taken  into  account,  almost  any  static 
situation will  look optimal.   If  no transaction is  going on to  improve a  situation,  it  is 
tempting to conclude that it is because the costs  of an eventual transaction (for example, 
the cost of organizing and monitoring would-be transactors) added to the payment involved 
in those eventual transactions make it unprofitable. If, for example, our industrialist persists 
in polluting the river even when the nuisance to bathers is greater than the benefit to the 
industry of using this polluting technique, it is, in one sense, because the "transaction" costs 
(the cost of organizing the bathers, of forcing them to reveal their true preferences and of 
collecting the amount required to convince the industrialist to reduce his operations, etc.) 
would  be  so  great  that,  added to  the  amount  of  the  bribe  itself,  it  would   exceed the 
potential benefit to the bathers.
In such conditions, the concept of an "externality" becomes clearly meaningless. An 
all  inclusive concept of the market would be capable of absorbing all  forms of human 
interaction, it is easy to see why. Any potential externality could or could not be eliminated 
by some type of negotiations involving costs. In the first case, by hypothesis, there would 
no  longer  be  the  externality;  in  the  second  case,  the  failure  to  eliminate  the  putative 
externality would be due to excessive economic (transaction) costs on the potential market, 
and  thus,  strictly  speaking,  there  would  be  no  externality  in  this  case  either.   Thus, 
according to such a neoliberal notion of an all inclusive market, there would be no more 
reason to identify an externality in this pollution case than in the fact that, because of its 
high production cost, you refrain from buying the Ferrari you might dream of owning.
Along such lines of argument, one could arrive at the conclusion that any situation 
whatsoever  is  optimal  since  any  improvement  would  be  implemented  were  its  costs, 
including transaction costs, low enough to make it socially profitable. It was just such a 
conclusion that  Mishan anticipated with  apprehension when he wrote  in  1971 a  rather 
ironic paper entitled "Pangloss of Pollution". The reference to Dr. Pangloss, the pleasant 
champion of "the best of all possible worlds" in Voltaire's Candide, was to suggest how the 
inclusion  of  transaction  costs  can  dramatically  change  the  analysis  of  pollution  and 
transform  into  an  optimal  situation  what  was  considered  as  one  of  the  most  serious 
challenges to economists' confidence in the virtues of the market. It might even be possible 
to push the matter further and suggest that such an argument could optimalize any situation 
whatsoever. Any dictatorial government, even of a type particularly inimical to liberalism, 
could be justified by an extension of  this  neoliberal  argument.  Dictatorial  governments 
activities interfere significantly with the consumption functions of its citizens by restricting 
their individual liberty. However, if the inconvenience suffered by these citizens was really 
that important, they could bribe the government to reduce its liberty-limiting activities to an 
optimal amount. If they do not attempt to bribe the government, it is clearly because such 
transactions would involve costs (information costs, organization costs, decision making 
costs and monitoring costs) which would be much higher than the benefits expected. On 
this ground, it would make sense, according to an extreme — although somewhat inverted 
— neoliberal  point  of  view,  to  characterize  the  situation  in  this  dictatorial  country  as 
optimal as it is! Naturally, one might object to such an application of the neoliberal theory 
of the market to a political (as opposed to an economic) situation. However, the actual 
relation between an industrialist and the neighboring bathers is not a typically economic 
relation, and consequently, it is not clear that alleged economic and political situations are 
really as different as first thought. As is well known, a number of prisoners successfully 
manage to bribe their jailers. And, after all, the application of economic analysis to political 
situations is, as is also well known, one of the major contributions of neoliberalism. In any 
case, the goal of this comparison was not to suggest that political and economic situations 
are  equivalent,  but  to  dramatically  illustrate  that,  if  pushed  to  the  limit,  there  is  an 
unexpected consequence to this conceptual change associated with the neoliberal approach: 
not only the concept of an externality but also its positive counterpart, the concept of a 
market, might loose their very meanings. 
It would be unfair, however, to conclude that Coase, or even Dahlman, are inclined 
to push their arguments to such a limit. On the contrary, both insist that their views do not 
prevent  appropriate  government  interventions insofar  as  the costs  of  such interventions 
would be themselves lower than the gains obtained by such interventions and lower than 
the costs (including transaction costs) involved in reaching a comparable result through the 
market.  In  other  words,  they  would  recommend  government  intervention  if  the  costs 
involved were lower than the costs it saved. In any case, concerning the present argument, 
the point is not that such a neoliberal approach would exclude any type of intervention, but 
that the scope of such interventions is reduced by the fact that no activities can properly be 
considered as going on outside the market and that consequently no intervention can be 
justified  simply  on  this  ground,  without  being  first  submitted  to  a  scarcely  feasible 
measurement of the transaction costs saved by it. The point is that, in such a context, it is 
apparently no longer meaningful to refer to externalities at all. 
5  Surviving as a (useful ?) concept 
But if such is the case, how has this concept found its way into so many papers 
written from a Coasian perspective during the sixties and seventies? How was it possible 
that  this concept had been treated as a useful tool in these papers? To answer this question, 
it  might be helpful to consider another influential  paper by James Buchanan and Craig 
Stubblebine  written  two  years  after  the  publication  of  Coase's  own paper.  While  their 
analysis is akin to Coase's, Buchanan and Stubblebine extensively discuss the concept of 
externality and even entitle their paper with a single word "Externality". The authors gave a 
definition of an externality which, at first glance, looks quite traditional: "We define an 
external effect, an externality, to be present when,  uA = uA  (X1, X2, ..., Xm, Y1). This 
states that the utility of an individual, A, is dependent upon the “activities”,  (X1, X2, ..., 
Xm,), that are exclusively under his own control or authority, but also upon another single 
activity, Y1, which is, by definition, under the control of a second individual, B,  who is 
presumed to be a member of the same social group." This definition looks similar to those 
of Scitovsky and Mishan, which are also based on the idea of interdependence between 
activities, but is in fact quite different. Buchanan and Stubblebine no longer mention any 
distinction between "paid" and "unpaid" or between "priced" and "unpriced" activities. In 
other words, there is no longer a semicolon in the utility function because there is no longer 
any distinction between what  is  inside (paid or  priced) and what  is  outside (unpaid or 
unpriced) the market. The dropping of the semicolon is not without consequences. Given 
that my utility is clearly dependent upon the activities my baker performs which are under 
his control but not under mine, how can one claim that no externalities are involved in our 
commercial relations without at least implicitly emphasizing that I can buy his bread or 
control his activities to some extent by paying for them, that is, by implicitly contrasting 
paid activities with the unpaid ones which involve externalities? Clearly, when we remove 
the semicolon from the definition, it becomes much more difficult to figure out just when 
an "absence of control" actually becomes a case of being "external" to a state of things 
which presumably would be characterized by "internal" relations.
In any case, Buchanan and Stubblebine introduced a few new distinctions between 
various  types  of  externalities  and  concluded  that  only  what  they  call  "Pareto-relevant 
externalities"  correspond  to  the  term  "externalities"  as  it  is  commonly  employed  by 
economists.  However,  this  last  remark  sounds  rather  paradoxical  if  we  consider  that 
"Pareto-relevant  externalities"  are  precisely  those  which  are  characterized  by  the 
opportunity for "gains from trade".  Since the opportunity for "gains from trade" is the 
typical trait of a neoliberal market, it is implied that the word “externalities”, as usually 
used by economists designates what is characterized by the normal working of the market 
as  opposed to  designating what  is  outside  the  market.  This  illustrates  just  how far  the 
meaning of the word “externality” was transformed, and even inverted, when used in the 
context of a neoliberal view of the market. The paradox, however, is partially dissipated 
when we consider that Buchanan and Stubblebine maintain that, once a Pareto equilibrium 
is reached, "Pareto-relevant externalities" vanish. Thus, externalities are present when such 
an  equilibrium  cannot  be  reached,  mainly  when  transaction  costs  are  too  high  and 
especially when "costs of organising group decisions [...] will prevent realization of some 
“gains from trade”".  In a neoliberal view of the market, situations like those involving our 
group of bathers, who can hardly organize themselves to exploit the "gains from trade" 
which  were  open  to  them,  can  still  be  characterized  as  externalities,  but  these 
"externalities" must  be defined in such a fashion that  they be clearly located inside  an 
ubiquitous market. Buchanan and Stubblebine, as well as Coase, place emphasis on the 
theoretical  capacity  of  the  market  to  internalize  any  situation  of  the  type  previously 
characterized as an externality. They do this in two stages: (1) such situations are presented 
as  elements  of  a  potential  market,  and  (2)  potential  markets  are  implicitly  treated  as 
extensions or nearly integral parts of the market.
But is the word "externality" an appropriate word to characterize a situation which is 
almost as internal to the market as situations giving rise to transactions, differing from them 
only  in  that  potential  transactors  conclude  that  these  transactions  are  not  worthwhile? 
Naturally,  material  situations  involved  (bathers  facing  industrialists,  farmers  facing 
ranchers  or  facing  smoke  emission  from  trains)  are  of  the  same  type,  and  one  can 
understand  why  economists  tend  to  use  the  same  word  to  refer  to  similar  material 
situations. But the word "externality" refers explicitly to an economic trait (that of being 
external to something) which is no longer meaningful in this new context. Without doubt 
this partially explains why Coase himself never used the term “externality" to expound his 
thesis and almost always framed it with inverted commas when he reviewed the whole 
question in a later book.  To clarify his discussion of the question, Coase synthesizes the 
usual definition in terms which, like those used by Buchanan and Stubblebine, refer only to 
interindividual  interaction:  "An externality is  more usually defined as the effect  of  one 
person's decision on someone who is not a party to that decision."  This sober definition 
does not refer to "direct" or "unpriced" activities, but it distinguishes between situations in 
which the person affected by a decision is "party to that decision" and situations in which 
that person is not "party to that decision". This minimal evocation (being not party to a 
decision) of what makes the externalities "external" to the standard working of a market is 
already too much externalization for Coase and prompts him to conclude negatively that 
such a statement is "representative of the mainstream economic analysis." 
It is true that most economists sympathetic to the neoliberal approach have been less 
reluctant than Coase to use a term so little congenial to their views. Consequently, the term 
"externality" has been used extensively after Coase's seminal paper. In any case, the recent 
literature, which tends to bear as much on externality as on transaction costs, has been 
devoted to either refining or discussing Coase's approach, applying the resources of game-
theory to the whole problem, discussing Pigou's  tax-subsidy schemes in the context  of 
transaction  costs  or  underscoring  the  limits  of  the  market  solution  in  the  context  of 
pollution or various forms of free-riding, etc. However, very little in this relatively recent 
literature has been devoted to the concept of an  externality as such. Consequently, the 
ambiguity raised by the concept of an externality which is in fact no longer "external" to 
anything has not been dissipated.
It seems reasonable to conclude that far from being clarified during its tumultuous 
history,  the  meaning  of  this  concept  has  become  increasingly  ambiguous.  After  being 
perceived more and more as a residual concept associated with the concept of an artificially 
designed  market,  the  concept  of  externality  was  reduced  dramatically  as,  with  the 
development  of  neoliberalism,  the concept  of  market  expanded to fill  the whole place. 
Having, in the mean time, been associated with the notion of interdependence, it continued 
to refer to any form of this type of phenomenon. No doubt in order to accommodate the 
neoliberal conception of the market, the concept of an externality had to be defined vaguely 
enough to avoid any implicit  reference to an outside of the market,  which would have 
restored it to its original meaning and would have, by this very fact, denied the ubiquitous 
character of the neoliberal market. Alternatively, when this concept has been defined in a 
more meaningful fashion, it was the very existence of the phenomenon to which it refers 
that  was  to  be  denied  in  a  neoliberal  perspective,  in  such  a  way  that,  specifically 
understood,  this  phenomenon was  treated  as  a  remnant  of  the  old-fashion  neoclassical 
approach  that  still  prevails  among  those  who  refer  to  a  highly  abstract  but  perfectly 
"civilized" conception of the market. 
* * * 
Economists do not seem to be bothered by these ambiguities. When it comes to the 
policy problems which are  most  important  to  them,  the  proper  definition of  a  residual 
concept could hardly be determinant, precisely because it is residual. When it comes to 
deciding  whether  taxing  the  polluters,  prohibiting  pollution  or  abstaining  from  any 
intervention will result in the maximal social product, it seems that economists can arrive at 
their conclusions without the help of any common satisfactory definition of externalities. 
Whether  we characterize  pollution  as  a  market  failure  or  as  a  situation  resulting  from 
excessive transactions costs,  it  does not  seem to affect  such results  very much indeed. 
Those referring to market failures would say that transactions do not take place between 
polluters and pollutees because their relations are external to the (actual) market which 
breaks down at  a  given point.  Those referring to transaction costs  would also  say that 
actual  transactions  do  not  take  place  between  polluters  and  pollutees  because,  while 
nothing is external to the market,  the transaction costs computed on a potential market 
prohibit these transactions from taking place. Insofar as the only issue at stake — and a 
large part of the post Coasian literature on externalities is concerned with similar issues — 
is  an  investigation  of  how  a  tax  on  polluters  and  a  banishment  of  pollution  would 
respectively affect the GNP, it is not clear that differences in the way one defines a market 
(should the market include potential markets or not? should it leave room for externalities 
or not?...) matters very much. With both types of definition of the market and externalities, 
it  is possible in principle to assess the respective effects of the tax and the banishment 
insofar as it is possible to assess the costs and benefits tentatively associated with each of 
them. Between both perspectives, the only difference which matters in such computations 
concern what should count as a cost to be deducted from the benefits, but the answer to 
such a question does not seem, at first glance, to be directly related to the definition of an 
externality. Saying that a cost should be counted in a cost-benefit analysis is not the same 
thing as saying that a cost  is  accounted for by a market.  Even if  an economist is  not 
inclined to refer to potential markets which are made inoperative by excessive transactions 
costs, that does not imply that he or she is not sensible to the fact that a prohibition of 
pollution implies tremendous monitoring costs. But, if such is the situation, why bother 
with defining a term like "externality" that we can dispense with without serious trouble? 
Do we not learn from the long debate on externalities that definitions and methodological 
considerations do not matter when economic results are involved? I am sure that many 
economists, including many eminent participants in the debate on externalities, would be 
inclined to conclude along these lines. 
 
However, from a different point of view, the very fact that economic issues might be 
independent of  the clarification of conceptual  issues raises,  in itself,  a  serious question 
about the meaning of these results of economic analysis. One cannot but be perplexed in 
considering the fact that the formidable problems that were associated with externalities 
like pollution, free riding, publicness, etc. have more or less dissolved as economists turned 
progressively from a Samuelsonian neoclassical  approach to a  Coasian neoliberal  one, 
from a pure competition to a laissez faire conception of the market. That this formidable 
challenge to the market was magically dissolved by a wave of the wand which has awaked 
a multitude of potential markets kept asleep by transaction costs, is in itself an index of a 
more fundamental issue.  Far from implying that such issues are also indifferent to the 
debate  concerning  the  definition  of  the  market  and  of  externalities,  the  fact  that  more 
typical issues raised by economists are relatively indifferent to this debate raises questions 
about the very meaning of economists' results.
 
In fact, what has been saved by the Coasian approach is the image of optimality 
associated with the market. Since Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, the idea of optimality has 
been more or less closely associated with the notion of the market, even if this idea was 
formally  defined  much  later.  In  this  context,  the  concept  of  an  externality  was 
characterized,  as  we  have  seen,  as  the  residual  of  the  market.  If  the  market  produces 
optimal  results,  sub-optimal  results  could  be  expected  outside  of  its  realm.  Thus,  the 
distinction  between  pecuniary  and  technical  externality  was  received  as  the  definitive 
annexation by the actual market of those situations which were associated with pecuniary 
externalities: in contrast with those associated with genuine externalities such situations 
became sheer manifestations of the normal working of the market. But with Demsetz and 
Dahlman, the market no longer has an outside, since potential markets fill the whole space 
not  occupied  by  actual  markets;  consequently,  the  distinction  between  pecuniary  and 
technological externalities ceased to be a significant one. In such a context, it is the very 
concept  of  optimality  which  starts  to  be  voided  of  meaning,  because  no  situation 
whatsoever  can fail  to  be optimal.  Actually,  the link between market  and optimality is 
ultimately based on the idea that people are not stupid enough to miss taking advantage of 
an opportunity of gain from trade provided by the market. But suppose that a significant 
opportunity  exists  somewhere  which  is  known  to  all  parties  but  which  is  not  being 
exploited.  Clearly  this  is  because  no  actual  market  is  organized  enough  to  permit  the 
required trade. It does not help to claim that a potential market exists in principle, because 
the problem is precisely that it is only in principle that such a potential market exists, which 
is  to say that  it  has little chance to become an actual market.  Markets are nothing but 
structures which facilitate and make possible trade. Consequently, a market is an actual 
market (though perhaps not a currently functioning one) or it is not a market at all. If it is 
practically impossible to create, forget it and acknowledge that we are outside the market! 
No doubt, the bathers could make an advantageous deal with the polluter, but the problem 
is that no actual market exists for such a deal to be made. Looking at potential markets and 
at transaction costs does not help because the transaction costs of creating the potential 
market are so extreme and so "unmarketlike" that it sounds reasonable to conclude that 
acknowledging this fact amounts to saying that no market exists or that markets fail to 
solve this problem.
 Given that the practical difference looks so slight between the idea of prohibitive 
transaction costs and the idea of market failure, it is hardly surprising that conceptual and 
methodological issues about the definition of externalities seem to be of little importance 
when it comes to solving an economic problem such as measuring the impact of various 
policies  on  national  product,  but  the  importance  of  these  methodological  issues  might 
reappear after all when it comes to deciding what should count as a cost and consequently 
what is ultimately the optimal solution. Indeed, the Coasian approach correctly suggests 
computing  all  the  costs  involved  in  a  decision,  but  it  does  not  say  how  to  draw  a 
demarcation line between various enterprises like organizing a multitude of bathers in such 
a way that (after revealing their true preferences) they act as a single agent to bribe an 
industrialist, organizing an oppressed people to bribe a dictatorial government and induce it 
to become more liberal, changing the mentality of a whole people on such or such a point, 
etc. It is true that all these potential activities have tremendous costs, but it is far from clear 
that this very fact is sufficient for them to be qualified as market activities. Above all, it is 
far from clear that an attempt to force them into the framework of the market will authorize 
us to apply to such a market the theorems concerning optimality which can be derived from 
the postulates associated with a typical neoclassical market. If I have attempted to discover 
the rationale behind the vagaries in the evolution of this concept, it is because I think that it 
might  help  in  clarifying  the  meaning  of  economists'  conclusions  which  are  at  least 
implicitly related to optimality and, it is because I suspect that, from this point of view, 
much can be learned from an analysis of the long and inconclusive debate on externalities. 
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